Better than independent: the role of minority directors on bank boards - Université de Limoges Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

Better than independent: the role of minority directors on bank boards

Résumé

Using a panel of controlled European banks, we examine whether board structures that include directors that are related to minority shareholders can be an effective corporate governance mechanism to limit expropriation by controlling shareholders, without exacerbating risk. We find that the inclusion of such minority directors does indeed increase the effectiveness of bank boards, as it results in higher market valuations whereas the presence of independent directors does not, without increasing risk. Our results depend crucially on whether or not minority directors are related to "active" institutional investors, the extent of holdings of related shareholders, as well as the strength of the supervisory regime. To identify the relationship, we use as instrumental variable for the presence of minority directors the distance of minority shareholders from the headquarters of the bank.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Barry-et-al-2018.pdf (479.79 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-01937927 , version 1 (28-11-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01937927 , version 1

Citer

Thierno Barry, Laetitia Lepetit, Frank Strobel, Thu Tran. Better than independent: the role of minority directors on bank boards. 2018. ⟨hal-01937927⟩

Collections

UNILIM
85 Consultations
271 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More